MILITARY AND PAKISTAN: AN UNENDING WALTZ OF AUTHORITARIANISM?

by Nofil Shah

There are armies that guard their national borders, yet some are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and then there are those that defend a cause. The Pakistan army does all three, according to researcher Stephen Cohen. He further adds that from the day Pakistan was created, the army used its clout and influence within Pakistan to ensure that it received adequate weapons, ample resources and an unrestrained supply of manpower. The Pakistan army regards itself as the special embodiment of the ideology of Pakistan, incessantly defending its overt activism in the society.

The Pakistan army seems to be a hostage to its origins, constrained by its inheritance of the British view of civil-military relations; transmitted to each succeeding Pakistani generation at its military training school, the Military academy at Kakul and its school for professional military training, the Staff college at Quetta. The British (in pre-independence India) envisioned the 'proper' relationship between the military and civilians acknowledging that ultimate responsibility lay in the hands of the duly appointed (or elected) civilians.

British colonial India was seized and ruled initially by the sword, and was governed for many years by military proconsuls. But towards the end of the British Raj's rule in the sub-continent, elaborate limitations were introduced to the military rule; administrative and fiscal mechanisms were devised to steer the military. The military's sphere of influence was reduced to recruitment, training, discipline and strategic planning. A few of Pakistan's earliest political leaders were wary of the army's 'proconsul' traditions. The first Governor-General (president) Mohammed Ali Jinnah spoke with solemn concern regarding the army's aggrandized role in the affairs of the government. Jinnah was unrelenting in saying that the defense forces are the servants of the people and that they do not make national policy. Rather, it is the civilians who deliberate the issues relating to the state and that it is the responsibility of the soldiers to carry out those tasks, which they were entrusted with.

After Pakistan acquired independence from the British, the country was geographically bifurcated in two distant regions East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (present day Pakistan), a thousand miles apart. In October 1958, President Iskinder Mirza repealed the constitution and handed power to the army chief General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who subsequently assumed presidential powers. Ayub Khan, the first military ruler of Pakistan ensured that legislation was retrospectively passed by the Pakistani parliament legitimizing his actions. Though Ayub Khan had lifted martial rule in 1962, his absolute rule lasted till 1969, when he was forced to resign following serious civil unrest and mass agitation. General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, the then Commander-in-Chief of the army in turn replaced him and re-imposed martial law. He too had to step down following the civil war, which resulted in the metamorphosis of East Pakistan into Bangladesh and military rule came to an end - temporarily, though.

The civil war was a by-product of autocratic rule by the Western Pakistani officials in East Pakistan since Pakistan's independence in 1947. It culminated in growing Bengali (majority of East Pakistan's population were Bengalis) discontent that resulted in the consequent dismemberment of Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the President of the severed state of Pakistan, introduced a new constitution, which came into effect in 1973. The general election of 1977 saw Bhutto sweeping the polls but the routed opposition party members incriminated Bhutto for the 'spurious' vote, alleging massive irregularities; and countrywide riots ensued.

Failure to reach reconciliation prompted the army chief of staff, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq to depose Bhutto in a military coup and declare martial law. Originally, Zia and his advisors were less concerned about the legality of their actions and hesitated in repealing the constitution of 1973. Zia later amended the constitution and determined that relinquishing power would not be possible unless an explicit settlement of the moral and legal responsibility for the violence, he and his cronies had authorized-including Bhutto's hanging. Zia legitimized his rule by conducting a referendum in 1984 urging the country's Muslim majority that by voting for him, they would vote for Islam. The garrison regulated affairs of government till Zia was killed in a plane crash in 1988.

After Zia's death, democracy was resuscitated promising momentary respite from martial rule. There were, however, major flaws in the 1973 (Zia amended) constitution. It gave license to the president (usually with military backing of-course) to toss out the government at his discretion. This fate has befallen the administrations of Benazir Bhutto (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter) in 1990, Nawaz Sharif in 1993 and Bhutto again in 1996. After Sharif's return to power in 1997 with sweeping success in the general election securing two-thirds majority, he struck that provision out from the constitution. But the bigger problem was that the same faces kept coming back: the parties of Bhutto and Sharif dominate the political system of Pakistan. On 12 October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff (COAS), seized power displacing Sharif, and proclaimed himself 'chief executive'. "Despite our deep disappointment with this latest setback to democracy in Pakistan, we have no choice but to stay engaged," said Karl Inderfurth, the Clinton administration's assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs.

Treason doth never prosper: what's the reason?
For if it prosper, none dare call it treason, (Stanislaw Andreski)

Some theorists suggest that the Pakistan army intrudes in civilian affairs to save its repute (which has been disfigured by the desire to meddle in civilian affairs) as 'troubleshooters'. Professionalization makes the armed forces, as it were, self-centered and like other professions, they develop a sense of corporate unity vis-à-vis the layman- those 'civies', 'frocks', or 'pekins' soldier slang. In its fifty eight years of existence, said one political party member, Pakistan has not seen any accountability of the annually growing defense expenditure, what so ever.

Supporters say General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's new military ruler, is an economical man: he chooses his words carefully and counts every penny. He's "mentally quick," according to a military insider, and likes to read speeches by Abraham Lincoln. Although his coup was planned and executed with precision but what followed was anything but. In a country founded on Islamic belief, Musharraf does not wear his faith on his sleeve, as did an earlier military strongman, General Zia-ul-Haq. Before 1977, the motivating factors inculcated in military training institutions were patriotism and pride in the army as loyal Pakistanis. Zia-ul-Haq changed all this and introduced the additional motivating factors of faith in Islam and pride as being true Muslims. Officers inducted in the armed forces after 1977 began looking upon themselves not only as soldiers of the state, but also of Islam. Musharraf himself was monumental in the induction of Osama Bin Laden into the Afghan theater. Later, as the Director-General of Military Operations serving under Benazir Bhutto in her second term as prime minister from 1993-1996, he distinguished himself as one of the godfathers of the Taliban. But today, in Musharraf's mind, faith is private and he would like to detach religion from the armed forces but he can't, since the army within the army, led by the likes of Lt. General Mohammad Aziz and Lt. General Muzzafar Usmani won't let him. It was this ''army' within the army that captured power for him and paved the way for his take over; therefore he can't be dismissive of their views.

Musharraf was considered a passionate nationalist, believing the army should help the government serve the country properly. But after deposing Sharif in 1999 and deriving power from the April referendum 2002 that validated his rule as president for 5 years, the incipient affaire as chief executive (a mundane title advisedly opted to avoid the sound of dictator) and maintaining his (terminated) office of chief of army staff (discharge orders of Musharraf had been issued before Sharif's government was toppled); he has evolved into the Machiavellian prince. Pakistan army's disillusionment with democracy for the past 11 years--following more than a decade of the military-led government of Zia ul-Haq--runs deep and has been growing fast. The plight of 9/11 attacks unalleviated Musharraf's totalitarian rule extending the mantra of military steered reforms and authoritative delegation.

However, the present governmental system is crowded by anomalies since the chief of army staff (who should be subordinate to the defense minister and the prime minister) is the president himself. Serving soldiers are technically not authorized to hold public office, as enshrined in the country's repeatedly tampered 1973 constitution. But Musharraf apparently has answers to all his quandaries. Justifying the coup on state television with an uncanny profoundness, Musharraf spoke (in English, the language of the elite) about the constitution as being held in 'abeyance'. "The Supreme Court or High Courts and any other court shall not have the powers to make any order against the chief executive or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority," says the order passed by Musharraf as part of what he calls a "provisional constitution". Pakistan's military government has further proposed a major constitutional shake-up that will give President General Pervez Musharraf the power to sack the prime minister and dissolve parliament. If the prime minister is removed from office, the obligatory assurance of general election within three months has also been made constitutionally discretionary.

The present situation is alarmingly unwieldy because there is widespread belief within the upper ranks of the military that a stable, orderly civil-military relationship is vital to the security of Pakistan. After he became president, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto received complete cooperation from the military. Bhutto's White Paper on Defense organization was part of a concerted effort to ensure civilian control over Pakistan's defense forces. The 1973 Constitution provided stern penalties for challenging civilian rule such political involvement as treasonous punishable by hanging; the White Paper provided the intellectual justification for it. The military has time and again intervened in government matters exhibiting their discontentment with political parties and the bureaucracy, all along wary of its figure as the requisite sacrosanct bully. Military rule in Pakistan has been erratic, tactless and reprehensible.

Pakistan's return to military rule belies the notion that the 20th century is ending on a wave of irreversible, global democratization. Pakistan's military junta will eventually need to attain and embody legitimacy. If experience is any guide, the initial popular relief at the army coup will not last long. As was seen in the presidential referendum in April 2002 when citizens were made to vote under duress, that exercise was overseen by the chief judge of the Supreme Court that validated the 1999 military takeover. What followed month later was a textbook tailored parliamentary election in September 2002 in the wake of Legal Framework Order 2002 leading to a parliamentary majority for Musharraf loyalists. LFO further calls to establish a National Security Council, a supra constitutional body with the three service chiefs, the prime minister, leader of opposition and president in chair. It institutionalizes the military's presence in Pakistan political setup, says the European Union's 2002 election report and gives overriding power to president who also is the army chief to undo parliamentary acts. "If you want to keep the army out, you have to bring it in", said Musharraf on state television.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's parting speech to the troops on Wednesday not only contained emotions at the ending of his 46-year-long career in the army, but also a subtle message. "This army is an integrating force, the saviours of Pakistan," he said after having bestowed the mantle of COAS on his most trusted confidant, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. "Without it, the entity of Pakistan cannot exist." This statement of the former soldier President was followed by criticism of those who "raise fingers at this army". "They are lost people," he said. "They don't know that the army has played an important role in the integration and development of Pakistan." In recent months, the political role of the army has come under widespread criticism from all the opposition parties, lawyers, journalists and human rights groups. Were the president's remarks an invitation to the army to protect Pakistan against those "lost people", or was he just making a casual remark about the political situation of the country?

Government circles are confident that his support in the army is not likely to be shaken if the country's transition to democracy goes smoothly. "Besides being the army's most recent chief, he will continue to be the supreme commander of the armed forces in his capacity as the country's president," Advocate General Malik Abdul Qayyum told a Pakistani TV channel recently. This will help President Musharraf keep in touch with the affairs of the army. Traditionally, it is the head of the army and the chiefs of two intelligence services, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Military Intelligence (MI), who seek to exercise direct influence over political decision-making when they feel the need arises. The present holders of those posts were hand picked by President Musharraf, apparently on the basis of his understanding of their loyalty and competence. Besides, they will be under pressure to support President Musharraf in order to stabilise their own newly acquired positions.

Viewed in the perspective of these political "dogmas" by the uniformed spin doctors, the country looks for both performance and political leadership. Pakistan's problems require not just administrative skill, but also acknowledged national political acumen. Islamabad needs to establish representative organs to improve the frayed relations among the country's provinces and address the growing concerns of US and allies that Pakistan is a committed partner in war against terrorism. From facing several years of difficult economic reform, Pakistan needs to carry through a political renaissance and representative institutional revival and undo abrasive legitimist extra-constitutional half truths.

In his study of the military and society, Andreski distinguishes between four kinds of 'militarism'. 'There is idolization of the military, rule by the military, the peacetime militarization of society (even under civilian leadership), and the gearing up of a society for war. Pakistan has seen only the first two, and those too on sporadic bases'.